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Summary findings
Public spending aims to promote efficiency (by  *  But many programs whose stated rationale is to
correcting for various market failures) and equity (by  reduce poverty have instead been dismal, expensive
improving the  distribution  of economic welfare). This  failures. A popular reaction has been to clamor for
paper, draw  n from a book on public spending and the  reform of public spending, to demand finer targeting of
pool, is concerned with the latter. In it van de Walle  benefits to the poor.
focuises  on three key questions: What is the welfare  Most public spending programs are to some degree
objective? How are the benefits of public spending  "targeted." The question is, what degree of targeting is
currently distributed? How can that distribution be  optimal? Other things being equal, the more ways one
improved?  discriminates between beneficiaries, the greater
We must first be clear about how performance is to be  targeting's impact on poverty. But other things are not
juidged,  says van de Walle. Different assumptions about  equal. Fine targeting sometimes comes at a cost to the
policy objectives shape disagreements about program  poor. Administrative costs may escalate, political support
assessmenits  and recommendations.  may vanish, and behavioral responses may add costs to
Evaluating a policy's impact requires assessing how  targeted interventions.
different things would have been without it, but  There is no simple answer about how much targeting is
quantifying a counterfactual is not easy.  One approach  desirable, but empirical evidence from past studies
--  benefit incidence -ignores  behavioral responses and  suggests some clear principles. The optimal mix of
.econd-round  effects, and simply uses the cost of  targeted and universal poverty-reduction programs
provision as a proxy for benefits received.  Other  depends on several factors, including the characteristics
methods focus entirely on the individual's valuation of  of the poor (who they are, how many there are, and why
the policy benefits, allowing for responses to changes in  they are poor) and country-specific circumstances (initial
the individual's budget set.  conditions, infrastructure development, and
Sonie reasonably robust conclusions have emerged  administrative capabilities).
from studies of public spending incidence:  *  When poverty is widespread and administrative
Spending on basic services  - notably primary and  capacity is low, broad targeting is desirable and results
secondary education and basic health care - almost  from incidence of public spending studies should help
universally reaches the poor. The case for broad  guide sectoral and intrasectoral  allocations.
targeting, bv expanding the share of public spending on  *  Generally, what is needed is a combination of
these services, is well-substantiated. But even here,  universalism in certain spending categories and finer
monitoring  is required so that marginal investments are  targeting in others (for providing safety nets, for
not lavished on better serving the better-off.  example). Such a two-pronged approach is a sound
*  Certain food subsidy and distribution schemes,  starting point for policy design. But in implementing it,
social cash transfers (such as are common in the former  one should never confuse the ends and the means of
Soviet tUnion  countries and Eastern Europe), public  policy.
employment schemes, and other targeted transfer
schemies  have at times been quite propoor.
This paper -a  product of the Public Economics Division, Policy Research Department - is derived from "Incidence and
Targeting: An Overview of Implications for Research and Policy," a chapter in the book Public Spending and the Poor:
Theory and Evidence. Copies of this paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC
20433. Please contact Cynthia Bernardo, room N10-053, extension 37699  (49 pages).  June  1995.
;TIhe  Policy  Pesearch  W'Porking  Paper  Series  disseminates  the findings  of  Dork  in progress  to encourage  the exchange  of ideas  about
development issues. An objective of tbe series  is to get tbe findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The
papers carry the names of the autbors and sbould be used and cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions are the
autihors' own and should not be.  attributed to the World Bank, its Executive Board of Directors, or any of Its member countries.
Produced by the Policy Research Dissemination CenterPUBLIC SPENDING AND TILE  POOR:
WHAT WE KNOW, WHAT WE NEED TO KNOW
Dominique  van de Walle'
Policy Research Department,  World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington  D.C..  The author is
very grateful to Shanta  Devarajan, Jennie Litvack,  Kim Nead and Martin Ravallion  for their useful
comments  and advice on the chapter "Incidence  and Targeting: An Overview of Implications  for
Research and Policy" in Public Spending  and the Poor: Theory and Evidence  from which this paper is
derived.Table of Contents
1.  Introduction
2.  What is the Welfare Objective?
3.  How are the Benefits from Public Spending Currently Distributed?
3.1  Measurement of Benefits
3.1.1  Benefit Incidence
3.1.2  Behavioral Approaches
3.1.3  Incorporating  Behavioral Approaches in Incidence Studies
3.1.4  Data and Policy
3.2  Results
3.2.1  Lessons from Benefit Incidence Studies
3.2.2  Lessons from Behavioral Approaches
3.2.3  Lessons from Incorporating Behavioral Responses in Incidence
Studies
4.  How can the Distribution of Public Spending be Improved?
4.1  Targeting: Issues and Options
4.2  Choices and Tradeoffs
4.2.1  The Costs of Targeting
4.2.2  Evaluating a Targeted Scheme




Public spending aims at promoting both efficiency (by correcting for various market failures)
and equity (by improving the distribution of economic welfare). This paper synthesizes the results of a
PRDPE research project concerned with the latter objective.'  The project asked: Is the redistributive
aim being met by current spending practices? What room is there for improvement?
The concern about the distributional outcomes of public spending stems from three sources:
(i) Dissatisfaction with distributional outcomes in the absence of intervention.  Market
failures-lack  of access to credit,  for example-may  leave many households facing acute poverty.  But
even a well-functioning market economy can result in too much poverty and inequality according to
prevailing social norms.
(ii) The lack of alternative policy instruments. In developed countries, the tax system provides
an additional redistributive device to promote equity. In developing countries, where comprehensive
income taxes are generally  not a viable option, the tax system is much less useful in this task. Public
spending's  role in redistribution becomes that much more vital.
(iii) The need for fiscal restraint and the sharp tradeoffs this makes governments face.
Governments play a key role in the provision of certain public services, which are increasingly seen
to be of critical importance to developing countries, notably inputs to human capital development such
as basic schooling and health care. Provision is expensive and so hard policy choices come to the
fore.  Information on distributional impacts-particularly  the extent to which the poorest strata
benefit-can  help in making those choices. But getting the information can be expensive too.
This paper attempts to critically review and synthesize the project's  implications for policy
and research on public spending and poverty. It refers primarily  to the project's  main output-the
book Public Spendin,  and the Poor: Theory and Evidence (hereafter  PSP), and the various chapters
therein. A list of the chapters and authors can be found at the beginning of the reference section.  This
1paper focuses  on three key questions:  (i) What is the welfare  objective?  (ii) How are the benefits of
public expenditures  currently distributed?  and (iii) How can that distribution  be improved?
2.  What is the Welfare Objective?
We must first define clearly the welfare objective  against which outcomes  are judged. The
primary concern is with impacts  of public spending  on poverty. But, as is persuasively  argued by
Atkinson (PSP), even that may not be straightforward. Too often "...it  is tacitly assumed that the sole
objective  of policy is the reduction  of poverty, whereas the typical  social security  program in Western
countries has a multiplicity  of objectives.  Even if the alleviation  of poverty were the over-riding
concern, the relative efficiency  of different policies would depend  on the precise way in which
poverty is measured  and on the "sharpness"  with which the poverty  objective  is defined." (Atkinson,
PSP)
The way poverty is measured-including the choice of the living standards  indicator, the
poverty cutoff point and the poverty index  used to aggregate-is closely intertwined  with the policy
objective  (see for example, Ravallion  1994). However, the delineation  of objectives  is not always so
clear. At least three "dimensions"  of poverty have been the focus of concern: (i) utility, (ii) income
and (iii) capabilities.  The first is associated  with an important  strand of the literature on modern
public economics  where the idea of "utility"  is not only taken to be a representation  of individual
preferences, but also the basic objective  of policy such that only individual  preferences carry any
weight. This is often termed "welfarism"  following  Sen (1979). The "income"  dimension  is
sometimes  interpreted  as a money metric of the utility approach  and sometimes  as a distinct,
nonwelfarist  alternative.  So, for example,  in the former interpretation,  leisure which matters to utility
would be valued and added  to income  to obtain a measure  of 'full' income. This can also be adjusted
for differences  in household  characteristics  and the prices faced. By contrast, policymakers  often (it
2seems) espouse explicitly  nonwelfarist  objectives.  For example, raising income-narrowly defined as
command  over commodities,  but typically  ignoring  leisure-is  often viewed  as an objective in its own
right, such as by those who emphasize  economic  growth as the metric of development.  Finally, the
capabilities  framework  rejects both welfarist  utility and certain nonwelfarist  income-based  approaches
and argues instead  that poverty is the lack of certain basic capabilities,  such as avoiding hunger and
illiteracy  (Sen 1985).
Sen (in PSP) reminds  us of the many dimensions  to poverty and deprivation.  He defines the
welfare objective  in terms of the adequacy  of capabilities  to do things rather than the adequacy of
income. Posing the question in this way gives rise to a long series of further considerations.  How are
adequate  capabilities-such as good health for an active life-generated? What is the role of public
spending  on health care, education  and other services?  Or is household  income growth most efficient
at raising health levels? In PSP, Pitt and others, Alderman  and others, and Deolalikar  empirically
address some of these issues in the context  of both health and education  outcomes  interpretable  as
indicators  of specific capabilities.
Even if one takes a quite narrow view of the policy objective-namely to reduce income
poverty-differences in conceptualizing  and implementing  the objective remain. For example,
concerns  about errors of targeting  (leakage  to the nonpoor and failure to reach all of the poor) often
arise in this context and some argue that a policy's success should  be judged by its ability  to
concentrate  benefits  on the poor (for example  Cornia and Stewart, and Grosh in PSP). In the context
of the policy they examine,  Ravallion  and Datt (PSP) are concerned  with the same basic
objective-maximizing the impact  on income  poverty for a given outlay-yet  argue that a focus on
errors of targeting in implementing  that objective  is misplaced:  the policy which has the greatest
impact  on poverty is not necessarily  the one with the lowest errors of targeting.
3Focusing  on a specific target group may reflect either the direct importance  of the specific
policy objective  or its instrumental  importance  for another end. Appleton  and Collier (PSP) examine
the case for allocating  benefits by gender. They argue that such a case must rest on gender  being a
clear dimension  of disadvantage  or on the existence  of positive externalities  accruing to others as a
result of targeting  benefits  to women. They also share with Sen and others the view that using a
group identifier such as gender has the advantages  of being easy to identify  and hard to manipulate.
However, such broad characteristics  can be highly imperfect  correlates  of poverty, possibly allowing
only a modest impact  for a given outlay. 2 Appleton  and Collier's study brings out well the reality
that multiple  objectives  and constraints  on instruments  underlie our choice of policies.
A recurrent issue concerns  the weight  that should be given to the preferences  of the poor.
Should the welfare objective  be denominated  in terms of utility or income?  Should we be concerned
with how hard the poor must work? In short, should the adopted framework  be welfarist or
nonwelfarist  when the main objective  is poverty  reduction?  Kanbur, Keen and Tuomala  in PSP
illustrate  the consequences  of this decision  for targeting  and evaluation  rules. For example, they show
that if the policy objective  is the minimization  of an income-based  poverty index  and given labor
supply responses, accepted  rules-of-thumb  based on the welfarist  utility framework-namely that
marginal  tax rates on the poor should be low-are  overturned.  Under the alternative  nonwelfarist
policy goal, simulated  optimal  marginal  tax rates tend to exceed  60 percent (given  minimal revenue
requirements).  Consider, further, Sahn and Alderman's empirical  study (PSP) of the effects of Sri
Lanka's targeted food stamp scheme  on labor supply. They find strong disincentive  effects: men and
women lower total hours worked  as a result of the transfer. Is this a good or bad outcome?  If one is
judging this case within a welfarist context in which leisure is accorded a high weight, the policy may
then be considered  a success. 3 However, from the point of view of the policymaker  trying to achieve
the greatest dent in income  poverty for a given  budget, such behavioral  responses  may be important
4costs of the scheme. The same impact  may have been achieved  at lower cost and so, the policy judged
a relative failure.
Consensus  has clearly not been reached on these choices. Different  authors have different
views and the issues often revolve around normative  considerations  that may never be properly
resolved. Past efforts by economists  to capture all welfare objectives  of policy in a single well-defined
monetary  measure have clearly  been too ambitious. A more eclectic  approach  is justified, recognizing
that there are multiple dimensions  of wellbeing  and that they cannot  be easily aggregated.  In some
settings  a single  somewhat  narrowly  defined objective-such as reducing income  poverty-may  be
entirely  defensible, while in others it must be supplemented  by other information.  The message  that
underlying  assumptions  about welfare and poverty measurement  influence  the evaluation  of public
spending  programs is one to keep firmly in mind. This speaks to the need for clarity about  those
assumptions,  and a recognition  of how sensitive  policy conclusions  can be to changes  in those
assumptions.
3.  How are the Benefits of Public Spending Currently  Distributed?
3.1  Measurement of benefits
The measurement  and valuation  of the benefits of publicly-provided  goods has vexed
economists  for a long time. It can be very difficult  to price such goods, since markets often do not
exist for them and/or they are available  at a cost that may not be related to their marginal  valuations
by consumers. As discussed  by Cornes (in PSP), complications  in valuation  can be attributed
primarily to the existence  of two factors: (i) prices and other individual  or household  characteristics
may vary across individuals  so that a given total expenditure  implies different standards  of living for
different individuals  and the same quantity  of a publicly-provided  good can yield different welfare
gains; (ii) there are quantity  constraints, such that even if the correct prices were known and
5everywhere the same among identical individuals, it would be difficult to value benefits since
individuals are forced to consume more or less than they would like. A simple example of the first
point is that a school is worth much more to a family with young children than to one without them.
But there are many other examples. A supplementary feeding program will benefit a household in a
region or period in which food prices are high more so  than a household facing low food prices.  The
second factor is less obvious but may be just  as important. When goods are supplied in fixed
quantities by ration shops the available quantity is unlikely to equal the desired quantity,  so the price
paid may not reflect the true value to the consumer. The same can happen with public goods which
are intrinsically lumpy-a  road cannot be supplied only on the day of the week in which you happen
to want to use it-it  is there all the time.
Two general approaches to measurement can be identified. Neither is ultimately able to
adequately resolve the twin difficulties of variable individual and household characteristics  and
quantity constraints.  The first approach is found in benefit incidence studies and assumes that the
value of the benefits of a public service to the individual equals the unit cost of providing the service.
The second approach attempts to value benefits using various measures related to the notion of
consumer surplus,  in the attempt to arrive at behaviorally consistent measures.  I discuss these in turn.
3.1.1  Benefit incidence
Benefit-incidence studies-several  of which are included in PSP-typically  proceed by ranking
individuals (or more typically households) by some indicator of welfare (most commonly per  capita
household income or expenditures). In order to make valid distributional comparisons,  it is clearly
important that the welfare indicator be suitably normalized for cost-of-living differentials and
household demographics.  Next the unit costs of providing the public service are attributed across
subgroups according to household utilization information. This exercise reveals how the governrment's
6outlay on the particular  service varies across the relevant  welfare indicator. 4 Though this approach
has its definite  uses, it also has drawbacks.  These are becoming  well recognized  (see Selden  and
Wasylenko  1992) and many of them are discussed  in detail throughout  PSP. I shall now try to bring
together the main points.
In evaluating  the distribution  of the benefits, individuals  are ranked  by an often imperfect
welfare indicator. It may not adequately  capture the true distribution  of living standards  due, for
example, to measurement  problems.  But it may also be a misleading  representation  of the welfare
distribution  in the absence  of government  spending. The principal  aim of incidence  studies is to see
how the initial "pre-intervention"  position of individuals  is altered as a result of public spending.
Hence, an approximation  of the pre-intervention  position  is required. This is typically estimated  by a
welfare indicator such as income or consumption  which does not include the monetary value of the
benefits secured from publicly-provided  goods. This may be a poor approximation  since the level and
composition  of public spending affects incomes  and expenditures:  individuals  often spend their
incomes in ways that reflect the level of provision  of public goods  and services. There may also be
some shifting  of benefits, such as if wealthier  households  reduce their transfers to poorer ones as a
result of the latter benefiting  from a public program, as Cox and Jimenez argue (PSP). Similarly,
behavioral  responses  through time allocation  can entail that income  net of earnings from workfare
employment  generally  underestimates  income  in the absence  of access to such employment,  as
Ravallion  and Datt emphasize  (PSP). These are all instances  of the general problem of specifying  the
counterfactual,  to which I shall return.
Another limitation  of this approach  is that costs may be a poor proxy for individual  benefits
received. The cost represented  by a nurse's administration  of a polio and DPT vaccine cannot
possibly reflect  the value to a child of a lifetime free of polio, tetanus, pertussis and diphtheria.
Moreover, social benefits are not captured. The impact  of a mother's pre- and post-natal  good health
7on a newborn's  current and future health cannot be approximated well by the cost of a few pre- and
post-natal visits.  Unit costs may also be very hard to calculate exactly. For example, unit costs of
inpatient hospital visits will differ widely according to the illness being treated. They will also be
badly estimated if there  is rent-seeking including, for example,  the funneling of benefits away from
households.  Finally, the approach assumes that publicly-provided services are homogeneous across all
consumers.  Yet, quality may vary enormously and imply higher benefits to certain households and
lower ones to others.
With expanding access to improved and more detailed data sets, some of these problems  are
being tackled.  Various papers in PSP demonstrate some of the corrections and innovations that can be
made to improve the benefit-incidence approach. Many of the method's  deficiencies have more  to do
with data inadequacies than with limitations intrinsic to the approach and are thus shared with other
methodologies. For example, there is nothing in the traditional benefit-incidence methodology which
prevents the incorporation of quality differentials.  As elsewhere, the major impediment stems from
the deficiencies of available data.
What policy conclusions can we draw from such exercises? Although the methodology is far
from ideal, and so precise magnitudes may not be correct,  it is generally assumed that the broad
qualitative conclusions are indicative of reality. We still know rather little about how much difference
behavioral responses can make to key policy conclusions. Nonetheless, even a crude but careful
incidence study can be valuable to governments,  who often have little or no awareness of the possible
distributional implications of their policies, and to policymakers generally. The issue of how public
spending benefits are distributed is an important one and incidence analysis appears to provide a
useful first approximation.  I shall attempt to summarize some of the results to have emerged  later.
83.1.2  Behavioral  approaches
As already noted, a general problem  underlying  evaluations  of policy impacts, including
public-spending  changes, is the lack of the relevant  counterfactual.  Ideally, we would like to compare
situations  with and without  a spending  policy change. What would have happened  had the policy not
been implemented  or the public good not provided?  But we are rarely able to observe such a baseline.
Many facets of the economic  behavior of beneficiaries  and nonbeneficiaries  alike-including labor
supply, consumption,  saving and investment  decisions-may be affected  by public policies. It is
difficult  to accurately  trace responses  and their full general-equilibrium  effects. Yet these responses
have potentially  important  implications  for a policy's final impact.  This issue comes up repeatedly in
PSP, and a number of the included  studies can be interpreted  as attempts  to resolve the problem by
modelling  behavioral  responses.
Various  estimation-based  techniques  have been developed  that attempt to capture key
behavioral  responses. The general approach  has consisted  of trying to measure the program
beneficiary's  own valuation  of the benefit received.  The latter is deemed sufficient  for-or  at least
relevant  to-attributing  benefits  from public services.  (Alternative  nonwelfarist  approaches  [discussed
earlier, and by Sen in PSP] tend to downplay  the relevance  of such subjectivist  evaluations,  though
not dissimilar  problems  emerge in these approaches,  as I discuss  later.) The conventional  welfarist
measures  allow for behavioral  responses  to price and income  changes. They are generalizations  of the
old notion of consumer  surplus-the  monetary  value of a change in welfare due to a change in prices.
In the simplest  version, this is measured  by the area under the Marshallian  demand curve. As such, it
can be interpreted  as the sum of incremental  benefits from each additional  consumption  unit valued at
marginal  willingness-to-pay.
As is well-known,  the fundamental  problem  with consumer  surplus is that it ignores the
income effects of price changes.  This has led theorists  and some practitioners  to turn to the Hicksian
9measures  derived from the compensated  demand function  along  which utility is held constant.
Provided one knows-or  can infer-preferences, these new measures  represent exact analogs  to
consumer  surplus (see for example,  G. McKenzie  1983, King 1983, and Cornes 1992 and in PSP).
Under certain identifying  assumptions  (discussed  below), and provided  demand functions  satisfy the
theoretical  conditions  of utility maximization,  information  about utility functions  can be retrieved from
observed demand  behavior. This then enables  the calculation  of better welfare measures  based on the
monetary amount  that would make beneficiaries  as well off without  the transfer as they are with it.
The same methods  have also been used in attempting  to make behaviorally  consistent
comparisons  of wellbeing  across individuals  facing  different circumstances.  Prices and household
characteristics,  which are in general household  specific, must be controlled  for. This is required to
make the empirical welfare measures  interpersonally  comparable.  A number  of measures, including
the behaviorally  consistent  measures  discussed  above, aim to provide an exact money measure of an
individual's  welfare. For example, money-metric  or "equivalent  income" measures  fix a population-
wide reference  price vector and household  type as the basis for comparing  welfare levels (Comes,
PSP; King 1983). The equivalent  income  is then the money income that would be required by each
household  to maintain its present standard  of living at reference  prices and reference  household
characteristics.  It can be calculated  to establish a ranking  of households  in the initial pre-policy
position  as well as to establish  welfare level rankings following  proposed or implemented  changes in
economic  policy.
A special case of this idea is an equivalence  scale, which gives the welfare equivalence
between  households  at different compositions  and sizes (Deaton  and Muellbauer 1986, Browning
1992).  Equivalence  scales often incorporate  both potential  scale economies  and social  judgements
about the needs of preferential  groups such as the aged or children. When data are not available or
there are problems  of inferring  unique scales from behavior  (a general problem  I will return to) a
10decision  must be made on which equivalence  scale to use. The choice can matter to policy. This
message is strongly emphasized  by Atkinson  and by Jarvis and Micklewright  (in PSP). The latter
convincingly  show that one's view of how well targeted  to the poor the Hungarian  family allowance
scheme has been depends in part on the weights  attached  to household  size and composition  in the
welfare indicator. Indeed, they make a convincing  case that the incidence  of family allowances  could
be used to defend a wide gamut of policy reforms depending  on the underlying  assumption  about the
equivalence  scale (also see Atkinson  PSP, and van de Walle and others 1993, also in the context of
Hungary).
The behaviorally  consistent  welfare measures  have their limitations  even within the confines
of a purely welfarist approach. Unfortunately,  these are particularly  worrisome in the present context
of public and publicly-provided  private goods. Severe  problems  arise in identifying  preferences from
behavior for the purposes  of calibrating  utility-consistent  welfare  measures such as real income per
equivalent  adult, and equivalent  and compensating  variations. Conventional  demand  models do not
capture effects on utility  that are separable  from the consumption  of market goods; if the private
benefits derived from children or from public goods do not alter marginal  utilities derived from
market goods then those benefits will not be evident in observed  demands  for market goods. In
practice we identify the parameters  of conditional  preferences  from demand models-conditional on
certain nonmarket  goods-while welfare is about unconditional  preferences  (Pollak 1991). No doubt,
it will always be highly problematic  to infer the utility derived from public goods (for which no
markets exist and households  are quantity  constrained)  by looking  solely at demand for private market
goods (Cornes PSP).
More recently, one strand of the subject has directly studied  revealed  demand  for publicly-
provided  social services. In one approach, loosely  referred to as "willingness-to-pay",  demand
functions  for publicly-provided  services  are estimated  to calculate  service or facility  specific price and
11income elasticities  for diverse income and other subgroups  (Gertler and others 1987; Gertler and van
der Gaag 1990; Gertler and Glewwe 1989). The elasticities  are then used to calculate  behavioral
welfare measures  of the willingness-to-pay  (the compensating  variation)  of different groups for a
change in provision. To get around the obstacle of missing markets, the latter are proxied by
measures  of the full costs of public service  usage including  fees, travel and waiting costs. Hence, an
exploration  of the nonprice allocative  mechanisms  that determine  consumption  is used to calculate
willingness-to-pay  for the nonmarketed  good and for changes  in its provision. Applications  have
analyzed  the distributional  consequences  of introducing  user fees and earmarking  them for
improvements  in access and quality of facilities. 5 The method is discussed  by Selden  and Wasylenko
(PSP) and contrasted  with a nonbehavioral  approach.
Another strand of the literature has focused more on health and educational  outcomes  which
implicitly  have welfare significance.  Although  the practitioners  of this approach  (as represented  by
Pitt and others, Deolalikar, and Hammer and others in PSP) do not explicitly  define capabilities  as
their objective  function, one presumes that an empirical  formulation  of Sen's (1985) capabilities
approach would in some ways resemble  this one. The idea is to econometrically  estimate a reduced
form relationship  (representing  a potentially  quite complex  household  model, usually  encompassing
both demand and production  functions,  preferences  and budget  constraints).  This links a particular
outcome  (such as educational  attainment  or health status)-often as proxied by an indicator  of that
outcome  (such as enrollment  rates or infant mortality  rates)-to  a wide set of inputs including
socioeconomic  characteristics,  incomes,  prices, utilization  of public services, availability  of private
services and other complementary  public services and government  spending.
The study by Deolalikar  in PSP presents one example  of this approach. It strives to isolate the
marginal impact  of provincial-level  government  expenditures  on the health outcomes  (and facility
utilization)  of different income groups controlling  for a multitude  of other factors and inputs that may
12influence  that relationship.  The method throws  light on the incremental,  or marginal, incidence  of
benefits. In other words, it can be used to examine  how changes  in government  spending  are
distributed, but not how inframarginal  spending  is distributed  across groups.
In the same spirit, econometric  techniques  have been used to control for behavioral  responses
and for simultaneity  when attempting  to assign causality  to public expenditures.  The study by Pitt,
Rosenzweig  and Gibbons  (PSP) is concerned  with purging estimates  of the impact  of public services
on social indicators  of the repercussions  of endogenous  factors in their placement. The fact that public
programs are often geographically  located  as a result of unobservables  (whose  effects are then
difficult  to sort out from those of the programs)  has long put a damper on evaluations  of the impact of
public investments  in infrastructure  (see Binswanger  and others 1993; Rosenzweig  and Wolpin 1986).
Pitt and others implement  a methodology  for dealing with the nonrandomness  of program  placement
and demonstrate  how important  doing so is for estimating  the kinds of reduced form relationships
discussed  above. Estimations  of both the magnitude  and direction  of the impact  on outcomes  are
found to be influenced.  To give  just one example,  cross-sectional  estimation,  typically  used in
evaluation  work, suggests  that family planning  facilities  in Indonesia  increase fertility. By contrast,
the alternative  estimation  procedure  that allows for program  placement  effects does not.
Despite  their interesting  methodological  and empirical insights  and contribution,  studies such
as those by Deolalikar  and Pitt and others have somewhat  unclear welfare and policy interpretations.
They eschew a welfare framework  that would allow  a valuation  of the benefits  from an improved
outcome or a public investment  and a rule for judging them against other spending. For example,
both a health outcome and an education  outcome  may be strongly influenced  by public spending in the
respective  sectors. How do we decide relative tradeoffs  between  them?
The study by Alderman  and others (PSP) adopts a similar approach to the issues  but is
couched  within a potentially  broader framework.  The authors estimate  the impact  of both the quantity
13and quality of schooling on cognitive achievement outcomes in Pakistan.  They then estimate the
impact of cognitive achievements (and implicitly of public spending) on earnings.  Next, gains in
earnings can be linked up to estimates of the costs of schooling improvements and conclusions drawn
about targeted public spending based on social rates of return.  A utility function defined over earnings
(or income) therefore underlies the analysis, supplying a method for aggregation of social costs and
benefits. This provides  a way in which to valuate benefits from the publicly-provided inputs,
something other studies have been unable to do.  The methodology in this study could be further
generalized to include multiple outcomes-cognitive  achievements and discipline, for example-and
the tradeoffs in concentrating public investments on either outcome also assessed.  However, this
approach is confined to measuring  the income gains from public services; direct welfare gains
(independent of income) are not identified.
All these methods are handicapped by measurement problems.  Outcomes, in particular,  are
hard to measure accurately.  Like the traditional benefit-incidence approach, the econometric
approaches,  including the Alderman and others study, are limited in their ability to capture the effects
of externalities.  They will therefore tend to underestimate impacts when positive external benefits
exist. For example,  the kinds of external benefits discussed at length by Appleton and Collier in the
context of targeting women-the  effects of maternal education on child health, for example-remain
difficult to measure and account for  in a systematic way. Finding ways in which to satisfactorily
approximate the size and importance of externalities and account for them in measuring impacts of
public spending is an important area for further empirical research.
The welfare-economic underpinnings of the various "partial" approaches to welfare
measurement are not always clear. A key question concerns aggregation in the absence of an explicit
evaluation function. What tradeoffs are admitted against the health outcome for example (Deolalikar
in PSP)? Aggregation across sectors is one issue. Another pertains to the aggregation across
14individuals and the policy implications and operationalization of the measures.  Take the case of
willingness-to-pay approaches.  Most applications tie fees to willingness-to-pay, but whose willingness-
to-pay? If a flat fee is charged, there  will often be distributional implications. For example,  if
willingness-to-pay for schools is an increasing function of income as one would expect, and a flat fee
is introduced,  wealthier students will need to be undercharged so as not to lose poorer  ones.  But, the
policy will then transfer  rents from poor to rich households; there is no impact on poverty in utility
space and inequality will increase.  Differentiating fees across income levels can in principle get
around such problems but they have their own disadvantages, a point I will return to. A further  issue
is that imperfect information and endogenous preferences may result in tensions between individual
(based on estimated willingness-to-pay) and social objectives, and it is unclear how one would go
about resolving such potential conflicts. The literature gives us little guidance on these issues.
So far,  the above discussion has implicitly focused largely on utility,  in the welfarist context.
Things may not be much easier if we focus on capabilities instead. Like "utility",  we do not typically
observe  "capabilities" as such, but rather certain  "achievements"-for  example,  we directly observe
illiteracy,  not the capability of being literate-and  behavioral assumptions are needed to close the gap
(Anand and Ravallion  1993). However, there has been little work yet on the identification problem  in
capabilities-based empirical approaches or on how different capabilities should be aggregated.  As
utility-based conceptualizations come into question,  marked differences may arise in the properties  of
more practical  welfare measures.  For example,  for equivalence scales,  Lanjouw and Ravallion (1994)
show that scales calibrated by conventional utility-based demand approaches will have very different
attributes to ones that rely on information about achievements of certain basic capabilities of
individuals. The move toward broader concepts of "wellbeing" in the economic assessment of policy
choices will need further empirical research to help inform those choices.
153.1.3  Incorporating  behavioral  responses  in incidence  studies
Behavioral  approaches  contain important  lessons  for benefit-incidence  studies. All incidence
studies are essentially  comparisons  of pre- and post-intervention  distributions.  The contribution  of
behavioral  approaches  in this context is to obtain a better measure of the distribution  of welfare that
would have been observed without intervention-the counterfactual.  By measuring  benefits net of
behavioral  responses  the approaches  thus try to work out the real impact  of policy. Economic
analyses-such as some of those discussed  above-often try to do this in the aggregate  for some
"representative  household". The next step is to determine  impacts at the household  level and to assign
those impacts correctly in the distribution  of welfare. The studies by Cox and Jimenez, Sahn and
Alderman,  and Ravallion  and Datt in PSP provide  interesting  empirical examples  of such an approach
(also see van de Walle and others 1994). They illustrate  how econometrically  estimated  parameters
and simulation  techniques  allow what are basically  benefit-incidence  studies  to be modified so as to
incorporate  incentive  effects and thereby attain a more precise estimation  of the distribution  of a
policy's net benefits across households.
In order to assess the real impact  of a public employment  scheme on poverty, Ravallion  and
Datt argue that the foregone  incomes  of participants  must be netted out of the distribution of transfer
benefits. Their task is to estimate  the cumulative  distribution  of incomes  that would have existed  had
the workfare option not been available, and to then compare  that distribution  with the one observed
with the policy. To begin, they econometrically  model individual  time allocation  across all potential
activities  (including  self and wage employment,  leisure, domestic work, and unemployment).  The
results are next used to simulate  time use and incomes  in the absence  of public employment  and to
draw conclusions  about the intervention's  net welfare outcome.
In the same spirit, Sahn and Alderman  examine  how labor supply disincentive  effects of food-
based income  transfers result in a divergence  between net public expenditure  increments  and net
16transfers to households.  They proceed by modelling  labor supply conditional  on labor market
participation.  The resulting  parameters  are then used to simulate  the counterfactual  of what
individuals'  labor market effort, and hence incomes,  would have been in the absence of the Sri
Lankan  food-stamp  scheme.
Cox and Jimenez turn the issue on its head and look at how the behavioral  responses  of some
key nonbeneficiaries  may also have bearing on a policy's net impact. Their concern is with the
responsiveness  of interhousehold  charity to the introduction  of public redistributive  programs. Cox
and Jimenez  econometrically  estimate the determinants  of net transfers received  in the absence  of
government  intervention  using household  level data for the Philippines,  and use the predicted
parameters  to simulate  the likely private transfer response  to the introduction  of unemployment
benefits, lump-sum  transfers to those below the poverty line and retirement  benefits.
As I have noted, simulation  techniques  are often used, here and elsewhere,  to draw out
behavioral  implications  from empirical models.  It is worth noting that simulations  may often require
additional  assumptions,  which may in turn be important  in drawing policy conclusions.  To illustrate
the point let us examine  more closely the interesting  findings of Cox and Jimenez. The unemployment
insurance  simulation-which indicates  a dramatic  displacement  effect of 74 percent of private
transfers-assumes that unemployed  male household  heads are provided  with cash transfers equal to
one-half  their imputed  eamings, and that this causes donors  to treat these households  as if their head
is now employed. As the authors point out, the bulk (over 90%) of the displacement  is driven by the
shutting  off of the "household  head not employed"  dummy  variable in their econometric  model. The
state of being unemployed  is a strong attractor of transfers independently  of income.
The analysis  provides us with an upper and lower bound  estimate  of private transfer
displacement,  and flags how critically the results depend  on an assumption  that is itself difficult  to
test. Given our limited knowledge  of how donors  view unemployed  people receiving  unemployment
17compensation,  it is important  to be aware of this assumption.  It might be argued, for example, that it
is equally plausible that donors continue  to view the household  head as unemployed  even if he
receives  unemployment  compensation  from the government,  since he is in fact still jobless and
receiving  only half of his normal earnings. Possibly  donors  will ultimately  be looking at people's
consumption-what the recipient  household  can afford relative to what it is accustomed  to. The
interpretation  of the (highly significant)  positive coefficient  on the unemployment  dummy-controlling
for income-in the regression model clearly  matters to the policy  conclusions.  The dummy  variable
could  be proxying for a fall in income  connected  with unemployment  or it could indicate  sensitivity of
the donor to the increased  risks faced by the unemployed  or to the real drop in income since the
previous period.
The lesson here is how crucial the interpretation  of the empirical  model can be to the policy
implications.  Underlying  theoretical  assumptions  must be examined  carefully,  and one should probe
sensitivity  of simulation  results to those assumptions.
More and better data and methods  will yield added scope for incorporating  behavioral
responses into incidence  assessments.  This is to be welcomed  in that it allows us to relax some of the
assumptions  of standard  incidence  analysis. However, this development  can be a mixed blessing. As I
have tried to illustrate  above, new assumptions  have to be made and these may, in and of themselves,
largely determine  the conclusions.  More empirical  work is needed to test those assumptions.  An
important  but often neglected  role for research is that of comparing  policy applications  under
alternative  sets of assumptions.  For example,  case studies comparing  policy conclusions  from simple
nonbehavioral  rule-of-thumb  methods  with more complex, theoretically  correct ones, would be very
useful. Selden  and Wasylenko's  contribution  to PSP provides one example. There is also a need to
understand  when ignoring  behavioral  responses  will matter most. Sensitivity  analysis  will help clarify
the generality  and applicability  of findings. This also involves  understanding  underlying  theoretical
18reasons. For example, it should be clear from past theory and evidence  that poor people will be more
responsive  to price changes  than rich people. Yet, in early discussions  of the effects of cost recovery,
a constant  elasticity  was assumed and likely curvature of the Slutsky  matrix conveniently  ignored. In
sum, we should not automatically  assume that more complicated  models will produce better or
fundamentally  different policy advice. However, more research is needed to determine  whether they
do or not.
3.1.4  Data and policy
Our knowledge  about  the poor in developing  countries-their location, their sources of
livelihood,  their links to the economy-have greatly expanded  with the availability  of more and better
quality household level data sets (Lipton and Ravallion  1994  review recent evidence). Yet it remains
that methodologies,  results and policy implications  are in many ways molded  by severe informational
constraints. As I have pointed out in various instances,  general data inadequacies  add to the
impediments  of correctly  measuring  the distributional  impacts  of public spending. Let me elaborate
here on a few additional  data-related  points to emerge from this research  project.
We are ultimately  interested  in impacts  on individual  welfare. Since data is most often
available at the household  rather than at the individual  level, assumptions  must be made about the
distribution  of resources within the household.  Common  practice is to assume equitable  repartition
and rely on per capita (or some other equivalization)  measures  of individual  consumptions.  Most of
the studies discussed  here (implicitly  or otherwise)  make such an assumption.  Yet, there is some
evidence  that the intrahousehold  distribution  of resources may not always  be equal, and that public
policy-induced  changes in household  consumption  may not affect the welfare of each household
member identically  (see Haddad and Kanbur 1990 and 1993); Cornia and Stewart (PSP) discuss the
implications  of this for efforts to target food interventions.  This measurement  issue has vexed the
19question  of whether women are "poorer", or in some sense deprived relative to men, as discussed  by
Appleton  and Collier (PSP). Behavioral  responses  within households  can also alter assessments  of
policy impacts at the household  level; for example, in their study in PSP, Ravallion  and Datt show
how cross-gender  effects in time allocation  within the household  have  bearing on the net benefits from
workfare.
Our understanding  of certain dynamic issues  in the incidence  of public spending  has also been
greatly constrained  by data limitations.  The analysis  of government  program impact  has been for the
most part static. Yet, in developing  countries  (particularly  in rural settings)  and in transition
economies, a key concern pertains to the variability  in living standards  to which the poor-in
particular-are prone. The performance  of public spending  programs in providing  effective  safety nets
that lower risk and income variability, protecting  households  from uninsurable  risks and shocks for
which insurance markets do not exist, is clearly  of considerable  importance.  Evaluations  based on a
single cross-section  may not be very informative  about impacts  on living standards. As shown in
benefit incidence analyses  for Indonesia  and Malaysia's  health and education  sectors (respectively  van
de Walle, and Hammer  and others in PSP), analysis  of two cross-sections  or more reveals how
marginal changes  in public expenditures  are distributed ignoring  all behavioral  incentive  effects. Panel
data, which follow households  over time, present a promising  new avenue  for combining
determination  of both dynamic  and behavioral  effects. As yet, few studies have applied this approach
to examining  the distributional  performance  of public programs  over time. One exception  uses a
Hungarian  panel to examine  how well the social safety net performed  both in protecting  families  from
falling into poverty and in promoting  the poor out of poverty  during a period of the early transition
(van de Walle and others 1994). The collection  and setting up of panels are becoming  more common,
which will hopefully  make the exploration  of dynamic issues  easier. This is a ripe area for future
research.
20Finally, economists  doing research in this area have tended  to focus exclusively  on household
decisionmaking,  while taking governrment  outlays as given and simply ignoring  other factors-such as
the macroeconomic,  political economy  and institutional  environments.  As shown by Pitt and others
(PSP), an understanding  of government  budget  allocation  and program placement  rules may be
fundamental  to coming to grips with public spending  impacts. This will require that effort be invested
in the collection  of new sorts of data, such as time series of the stock of spatially  available
infrastructure  and of the "history" of government  investments.  Such new data needs to be
accompanied  by imaginative  ways of getting at, and incorporating  into measurement  methodologies,
the context within which households  and governments  make their decisions.
The overall macroeconomic  environment  clearly has bearing on the effectiveness  and
sustainability  of specific poverty alleviation  strategy and spending  decisions.  Public expenditure  plans
are made within the context of general policies and the state of the economy. For example,  the
capacity  to tax is pertinent to public spending  objectives  and outcomes. A growing economy  which is
generating  broad-based  employment  provides  a very different context for discussing  public spending
decisions  than one that is in recession. Governments  also worry about the political consequences  of
their policies. Political  economy  considerations  are critical to understanding  motivations,  constraints
and outcomes  of public spending  policy. Details  on institutional  and service delivery capacity-of
which there has also been a lack of consideration-are likewise  relevant to explaining  the distribution
of public spending. Household  survey data and government  budgetary  data throw little light on these
relevant  features. The above information  will be important  in determining  how to improve  incidence
but also in assessing  why benefits are distributed  in the way that they are. For example, there may
exist bounds to how progressive public spending  benefits  can be due to political economy,
macroeconomic  and institutional  factors, which too often are ignored.  Incorporating  information  on
21such constraints may provide us with more realistic benchmarks against which to judge distributional
outcomes.
Assessing incidence and determining how best to improve distributional outcomes are the vital
first steps.  But, the follow-up-reform  implementation-begs  a further understanding of the political
economy of reform: Why and when is reform undertaken? Why and when is it successful?
Economists are often at a loss when such issues come to the fore, but they should make no mistake
about their relevance.
3.2  Results
Provided one is aware of their deficiencies, much of the data and methods commonly used in
practice can be useful and informative. The (few) studies that have attempted to compare  results on
incidence have found the methodologies broadly in agreement (Selden and Wasylenko discuss this
issue in PSP).  Still, the results should be taken as indicative of likely directions of benefit incidence,
rather than precise magnitudes. Subject to the caveats discussed above, some reasonably clear patterns
can be discerned from studies of the distribution of benefits from public spending in developing
countries. They are briefly summarized here. 6
3.2.1  Lessons from benefit incidence studies
Only a few benefit incidence studies have examined the totality of public spending (Selden and
Wasylenko 1992, provide a review).  Studies more commonly focus on one or two sectors as do the
case studies in this book. I will follow suit here.
A distinction should always be made between the distribution of benefits in monetary amounts
and that of benefits expressed as a percentage of the welfare indicator (typically per capita
consumption or income). Investigations of the education, health, social transfers  and nutrition sectors
22commonly  find that in the aggregate  subsidies  are at least mildly "progressive"  in that they are higher
for the poor as a percentage  of initial income  or expenditure.  In contrast, absolute  benefit levels often
increase with the welfare indicator;  the poor get less in absolute  amount than the rich, though
inequality  is still reduced. Finally, an implicit  urban bias is common  in that public spending  amounts
are often found to be higher in more urbanized  areas.
However, study after study highlights  the importance  of looking  at within-sector  components.
For example, in the education  sector, benefit incidence  analyses  typically  find that primary, and often
secondary,  schooling  are propoor both in absolute levels and percentage  terms. This is a consequence
of the fact that in most developing  countries  poorer families  (at least as measured on a per capita
income basis) tend to have more and younger children, and that poorer children are more likely to
attend school at the primary than at other education  levels. Tertiary education, in contrast, is
invariably  prorich. The overall progressivity  will often depend on the composition  of education
spending. For example, as only a small share of the education  budget is devoted to university  training
in the economies  of Eastern Europe, the overall distribution  of education  expenditures  is propoor
(Milanovic,  PSP). In comparison,  high university  subsidies  imply a flat overall distribution  of
education  benefits for Malaysia, despite  the unusually  strong progressivity  of both primary and
secondary  spending  (Hammer and others, PSP). Generally, the more educationally  advanced  a
country, and the more developed  its private sector, the more public spending  on higher education
levels reach poor children.
These general patterns are supported  by Selden  and Wasylenko's  investigation  of the
education  sector in Peru, and the Hammer  and others study of Malaysia  (both in PSP). The former
also find that spending levels are higher in urban areas and that, as beneficiaries  of education
subsidies, girls are deprived relative to boys. Milanovic  finds that in the Eastern European  economies
too, the distribution  of education  benefits are progressive  though decreasingly  so the higher the
23education level. Kindergarten  benefits exhibit the best propoor targeting while university benefits are
the least well targeted.
Health sector expenditures also vary in their incidence according to the level of service.  In
particular,  primary health care centers dispensing preventive and curative care are usually more
propoor than hospital services. Van de Walle (PSP) determines that although the health subsidy in
Indonesia is progressive,  an untargeted uniform lump-sum transfer would be more so.  Hammer and
others find that in Malaysia the poor garner a disproportionate amount of the subsidy on health care.
This is attributed in great part to the fact that wealthier households opt for the private sector for their
medical care.  In the Eastern European economies, total as well as specific health sector components
are found to be equally distributed across individuals just prior to the transition. Milanovic argues that
this results from the combination of free socialized medicine and the nonexistence of a private
alternative at the time.
The story concerning general food subsidies is similar. Universal food subsidies tend to be
quite progressive  when expressed as a proportion of income, while absolute amounts tend to be lower
for the poor (Cornia and Stewart, and Grosh in PSP). However,  food schemes are heterogeneous and
are more often targeted and implemented under  a multitude of guises including food stamp and ration
schemes,  infant feeding, school meals, etc. Their incidence varies according to the food commodity
(incidence will be more progressive  for goods which the poor favor more than the rich) and the
degree of targeting generally. Grosh shows that benefits are better concentrated on the poor under
targeted schemes than under universal food subsidies in the Latin American programs she reviews.
However, as I will be discussing shortly, targeting brings about its own costs,  which should be netted
out in determining the incidence of benefits. Cornia and Stewart also argue that there  are important
costs to excluding some of the target group, a common result of narrowly targeting food programs.
24Social cash transfers, comprising  of pensions, family allowances,  sick pay, scholarships  and
other transfers, represent a significant  source of income  for households  in the former communist
economies  of Eastern Europe and in most OECD economies.  Although  there are variations among  the
former, Milanovic (PSP) argues that, at the start of transition, the total cash transfer distribution  there
was more or less uniformly  distributed  across income  groups. This reflects the fact that the most
substantive  of the transfers-pensions and family allowances-had opposing  incidence  patterns.
Pensions  showed a tendency  to be prorich (Russia  provides one exception),  while family allowances
were generally quite propoor (in percentage  and absolute  terms) for reasons not dissimilar to why
primary education  is propoor in developing  countries. However, Jarvis and Micklewright  (PSP)
caution that, at least with respect to Hungary in the pre-reform  period (pre-1990), this result hinges
on the equivalence  scale used in ranking  households  in the pre-intervention  state (also see van de
Walle and others 1994).
Two studies in PSP explore incidence  changes  over time using the benefit incidence
methodology  for two points in time. To our knowledge  no other studies have done this. A comparison
of incidence  at two or more dates enables  a determination  of how spending  changes  were distributed
across different groups. It is sometimes  argued that if the rich already gain from public services,
marginal  spending must per force reach the poor. Yet, additional  scenarios can be ventured. For
example, spending  increases  may be devoted  to quality improvements  for current beneficiaries.
Political economy  considerations  may buttress this prospect. So, the issue provides an interesting
empirical  question. The results indicate  that distributional  improvements  occurred for Indonesia's
public health sector outlays  (van de Walle, PSP) and for Malaysia's  health and education  expenditures
(Hammer  and others, PSP). In both countries, the poor's participation  rates increased  markedly over
the period. The benefit incidence  methodology  is unable to fully account for the factors underlying
incidence  patterns. In the Indonesia  case it is not clear to what degree government  policy as opposed
25to income growth is responsible for increased equity in public expenditure  incidence during the
period; though both factors were undoubtedly instrumental. What is clear is that much of the
distributional gain was captured by the urban poor.  The Malaysia case study attempts to understand
causality by supplementing the incidence analysis with regression analysis. Malaysia's  policy of ethnic
targeting is credited with the success in the education sector,  while propoor  improvements in the
health sector are attributed to the private sector's  increasing ability to attract wealthier households.
The latter also appears to have been a factor in propoor  changes in urban Indonesia.
3.2.2  Lessons from behavioral approaches
There is less to say here as the literature concerned with allowing for behavioral responses
remains at an early stage and has yet to develop proven patterns in its empirical results. Heavy data
requirements (such as on prices) and methodological pitfalls (simultaneity, endogeneity and self
selection biases) have made progress slow. The research, which has focused on estimating the effects
of price changes on behavior and welfare, has for the most part found that in the aggregate the
demand for public services tends to be price  inelastic. More importantly from an equity viewpoint
however, the studies also find that elasticities vary across income groups and that the poor are
invariably more price  responsive (Gertler and van der Gaag 1990).
Attempts to measure the impact of public spending investments on outcomes (such as those by
Pitt and others,  Deolalikar, and Alderman and others in PSP), find that this can be a noisy
relationship and one that is arduous to isolate. Deolalikar's  results indicate that marginal changes in
Indonesia's  provincial health spending have a positive effect on children's utilization of facilities and
on their health outcomes though both results apply to a greater degree for children of well-off
households. This leads him to conclude that Indonesia's  public health care services are poorly
targeted. Alderman and others establish that girls and children in a poor region are relatively
26disadvantaged with respect to public schooling benefits in rural Pakistan.  The situation could be
improved with little cost to productivity by targeting schooling quantity and quality improvements to
the disadvantaged groups. The Pitt and others investigation emphasizes the difficulties in
econometrically establishing ex post the impact of public expenditures.  Once the authors have
controlled for fixed effects and the nonrandomness of program placement (again for Indonesia), with
one or two exceptions, few programs  are evidenced to have much direct impact on health and
education outcome variables. The last study highlights some of the severe difficulties that make the
estimation of public investment impacts so elusive.
3.2.3  Lessons from incorporating behavioral responses in incidence studies
The key lessons here are ones already evident from the behavioral approaches discussed
above.  Behavioral responses can be of consequence to conclusions about the distributional impacts of
policy interventions.  In a number of the empirical case studies included in this review, efforts at
reproducing the relevant counterfactual have been used to inform policy evaluations.  Accounting for
foregone incomes in assessing the poverty impact of public employment schemes is found to be of
importance in Ravallion and Datt's study in PSP; it estimates that foregone incomes in two villages
participating in the Employment Guarantee Scheme (EGS) of India's  Maharashtra  state account for
about one quarter of total wage earnings on the scheme. Labor market participation responses to the
rice subsidy discussed by Alderman and Sahn have marked repercussions for the scheme's  net transfer
benefits.  Sri Lanka's  targeted food stamp scheme is estimated to have resulted  in a fall in labor
market participation of as much as 2.5  days per month for males and 2.9 days for females.  Finally,
the public provision of social security is estimated to result in substantial displacement of the private
moral economy that exists between households in the Philippines (Cox and Jimenez,  PSP).
274.  How Can the Distribution  of Public Spending  be Improved?
A good benefit-incidence  study can directly inform proposals  for spending  policy reforms
aimed at improving  the distribution  of benefits. The preceding discussion  has emphasized  our still
limited  knowledge  and continuing  uncertainty  about how to measure  benefits and hence, judge the
distributional  impact  of public spending. A number  of areas where further investigation  may pay off
in this area were identified. Still, specific country  case studies (including  those specifically  reviewed
here) do contain some clear and consonant  implications  for improving  the distribution  of public
expenditures.  First, governments  should invest and reallocate  budgets towards basic services. The
provision  of such services often fails to attract private sector interest and thus accords with the
principle  that governments  should be responsible  for valuable  goods which would otherwise  be
underprovided.  But, above  all, services  such as primary education  and basic health care are found to
be among  the best ways to reach the poor. Of course, care should always be taken that marginal
spending increases  are not being squandered  on better quality for existing services  consumed  by the
better off. Among  other categories  of public spending-including food subsidy schemes,  social
security and cash transfers-there have been both successes  and failures. Many programs which claim
to reduce poverty  don't.
The most commonly  heard proposal for achieving  a more propoor benefit distribution  is
"improved  targeting." That will be the main focus of this section. As I will show, a number of the
studies in PSP throw light on this policy issue, both at the level of methodology  and in substantive
policy conclusions.  Reform proposals  also often raise new issues, such as administrative  feasibility
and political economy  considerations.  In many developing  economies, it is the middle classes who are
currently the primary beneficiaries  of public social spending. Many of the poor are left out, while the
rich have alternatives-namely the private sector at home or abroad. Redirecting  or 'targeting'
spending  towards the poor will hurt the middle classes who, in the worst case scenario, may no
28longer  be able to afford the services. Households  in this group are often the most vocal and politically
important  constituency  for the government  (Nelson 1992). This political economy  reality has
considerable  bearing on final reform outcomes  and is a key issue to which I will return.
4.1  Targeting: Issues and Options
Targeting is here defined as a deliberate  attempt to shift the benefits of public expenditures  to
the poor by means which aim to screen them as the direct beneficiaries.  This is by no means a
universally accepted  definition.  The word is used to mean various things. Indeed, the research
literature and policy documents  are littered with different uses. To give one example, it is not unusual
to come across the word targeting  being used synonymously  with means (or income) testing. This is a
rather restrictive use of the concept and fosters a narrow interpretation  of the policy instruments  at a
policymaker's disposal. Although  the aim is ultimately  to reach those with unacceptably  low living
standards-often proxied by income-means-testing is only one of many methods  by which to identify
the poor.
Targeting has its critics. The anti-targeting  view argues that finely targeted  programs have
usually failed in either fully covering  the poor, or in avoiding  leakage  to the nonpoor. They are bad
for morale and create dependency.  They are not sustainable  because  they lack political support.
"Programs  for the poor are poor programs" is an often heard criticism. Furthermore, if governments
effectively  promote  economic  growth and invest in basic social services for all-through  broad
targeting  of budgetary  allocations-there should be no need for more finely targeted programs.
By contrast, for many, targeting  is unquestionably  the solution  to the poverty problem. Why
spread money around when, with targeting,  gains to the poor come at lower cost? For some, the
choice between "targeting"  and "universal  provision" is now viewed  as one of ideology. One
commentator  writes:
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welfare  states is distributivist. This is not surprising as they are by and large socialists
who subscribe to the common end of egalitarianism. (Lal 1994)
It is surprising to hear that  "socialists" prefer that less of a given budget should go to the poor,  and
that "egalitarianism" entails equal benefits to all rather than larger benefits to poorer people. Views
such as these suggest that there may be scope for greater conceptual clarity on this policy issue.
Without any attempt at targeting,  a development path in which both participation in economic
growth and access to basic social services is broad-including  both poor and nonpoor-can  be an
effective route to improving the living standards of the poor (World Bank 1990, Lipton and Ravallion
1994). Yet,  country experience (both developed and developing) also shows us that circumstances
often require supplementary,  more finely targeted, public action.  There are many examples.
Undernourished children should not be made to wait for long-term solutions such as education and
jobs if we can relieve their suffering now at modest cost-or  even positive benefit-to  long-term
welfare.  In the midst of an extended drought,  broad based solutions may offer little to famine victims.
An effective transfer program providing food for work, for example, can mean the difference between
life and death,  and also prevent damaging responses-such  as asset sales-which  inhibit long-term
poverty reduction. And, even in the best of times, some among the elderly and the disabled, for
instance, will require public assistance in order to meet their most basic needs.  Without a concerted
targeting effort some disadvantaged groups,  such as girls, severely disadvantaged in terms of
education in rural Pakistan (Alderman and others,  PSP), may never catch up to men.  The vast
majority of societies would no doubt agree with these principles.
Policies which attempt to identify the poor and target benefits to them can serve important
redistributive and safety net roles in a market economy (World Bank 1990, Lipton and Ravallion
1994). The risk is when targeted programs are seen as the main instrument for poverty reduction.
While a well-designed scheme can provide an important complement to a longer term poverty
30reduction strategy founded on equitable growth and propoor broad targeting of public spending,  it is
an imperfect substitute. Decisions on targeted schemes must always be made contingent on the general
economic and social sector policy environment. Moreover, in each specific case, the choice about
whether and how finely to target should be decided on economic grounds, starting from the (political)
value judgement that it is the economic value of targeting to the poor that matters most. The key
questions for policy become: how much targeting is needed and, what form should it take?
4.2  Choices and Tradeoffs
In theory,  targeting can lessen the social cost of reducing poverty. However,  in practice,  the
ability of a policy to concentrate benefits on the poor,  and its impact on poverty, albeit often confused
are not equivalent. The most perfectly targeted policy may not be the one with the greatest impact on
poverty.  Whether it is will depend on how costly it is to identify the poor and target benefits to them,
as well as the size of the disincentive effects and participation costs incurred as a result of targeting.
The benefits from better targeting can be large, but they can never be achieved costlessly. This point
comes up repeatedly in PSP. Both Sen and Atkinson's  contributions provide a detailed description and
analysis of the costs associated with targeting benefits.
4.2.1  The costs of targeting
The costs of administering a program can rise substantially when discrimination between
beneficiaries is required. There  is a widespread perception that the more finely a scheme attempts to
target,  the higher the administrative costs it will have largely as a consequence of imperfect
information (see Atkinson in PSP, and Besley and Kanbur 1993, for a theoretical exposition). There is
some evidence for this view. For example, a comparison of means tested programs (in which
recipients are screened by their level of income) and universal programs  (in which access is open to
31all) in the U.S. found that administrative  costs varied from 12 percent of total costs for the former to
2.5 percent for the latter (Kesselman  1982).  However, Grosh (PSP) disputes this view. Based on her
analysis  of a large set of targeted and universal  programs in Latin America, Grosh concludes  that the
administrative  costs of targeting  have tended to be overestimated.  Indeed, her research suggests  that
they do not systematically  vary in any significant  way across the diverse targeting  mechanisms
examined: the costs of administering  individual  assessment  techniques  (generally  assumed  to be the
highest)  do not appear to vary much from that of less intensive  methods  such as geographic and self-
targeting.  Grosh finds the median administrative  costs for these respective  targeting  mechanisms  to be
9, 7, and 6 percent of total program costs.
Still, the debate is unlikely  to end here. Grosh's definition  of the administrative  costs of
targeting is somewhat  narrow as it relates only to initial screening  costs. Yet, once the target group
has been identified, it is still necessary  to incur costs associated  with delivery of the benefit to that
group to the exclusion of others. Her study also highlights  the considerable  difficulties  faced in
accurately and comparably  quantifying  administrative  costs across programs. What can be said for
sure is that administrative  costs are likely to vary according  to administrative  and political contexts.
Indeed, they could be prohibitive  in areas where service  delivery systems and institutional  and
infrastructural  capacities  are not sufficiently  developed.  This is an area where a lot more research is
needed.
Targeted transfer schemes  (like other public interventions)  may also cause individuals  to
change their behavior. Such behavioral  responses  can intervene  between  a program's stated objectives
and its actual outcomes.  We have already seen how important  behavioral  responses  can be in welfare
measurement  and benefit incidence.  In the specific  case of targeted  interventions,  behavioral  responses
can entail additional  costs and benefits, which can have bearing  on outcomes.  Their magnitude  will
vary across schemes, and can also be influenced  by design and implementation  choices. A number of
32the empirical studies in PSP examine behavioral responses from diverse perspectives with relevance to
assessments of the costs of targeting.
For example,  the results of Cox and Jimenez suggest that the introduction of public transfer
programs, such as unemployment insurance,  often causes the well-off to cut back on their private
transfers.  They found evidence of that for the Philippines, and elsewhere found similar effects for
Peru (Cox and Jimenez  1992). Sahn and Alderman explore the much heralded  issue of the effects of a
targeted subsidy on labor supply incentives (also see Atkinson, PSP). They estimate the food stamp
scheme in Sri Lanka to have produced on average a 2 to 3 days monthly reduction in labor market
participation,  which translates into roughly 33 percent of the value of the subsidy benefits.  Such
behavioral responses may alter the distribution of the costs and benefits expected by policymakers. 7
Public employment schemes are another example.  Participants must provide labor in exchange for a
cash or food transfer. In so doing, they must forgo other work and the incomes they would have
earned had the scheme not been available. This is a cost to participants that should be netted out in
order to measure actual gains from the scheme. As we have seen, Ravallion and Datt find that
earnings in two villages in the absence of the EGS would have been equal to around one quarter of
that earned on the public works projects.  As a result of these costs, and the additional nonwage costs,
the scheme entails a net transfer of about half of its budget to the poor.
As always, one should be careful in drawing lessons for policy from all such empirical
results. They do not imply that public intervention is unnecessary or that it should be discouraged.  In
general, displacement-such  as of private transfers by public ones,  or of private employment by
public employment-will  be partial  (many recipients are still better off), and conclusions will also
depend on differences  in coverage such as of private versus public transfers.  There may also be
reasons to prefer government programs. For example, private transfers may not be able to deal with
widespread crises  where income shocks are covariate (such as in a recession or drought).  Public
33transfers  may also have important advantages over private transfers  in terms of their reliability or
insurance benefits.  It also seems plausible that private transfers impose higher costs on
recipients-accepting  money from the government does not make the recipient beholden to the donor
in the same way that accepting money from a relative, patron or friend does.  Even if public transfers
crowd out private transfers  entirely (i.e.,  the recipient ends up with exactly the same amount of
money), the recipient is likely to perceive herself as better-off for receiving the cash transfer from the
government.  Still other indirect benefits may tilt the balance in favor of the targeted intervention.
Even a modest gain to the poor from the assets created through public works schemes (a good deal
less than cost) would be sufficient to make this policy more cost effective than many poorly targeted
alternatives.
One important,  though often disregarded message here is that private behavior responds to
public intervention-whether  targeted or untargeted. The problem may be more pronounced  under
targeted interventions-particularly  due to adverse work incentives. Effective marginal tax rates of or
exceeding  100 percent are not uncommon and lead to poverty traps. Potential recipients (for example,
individuals above but close to the poverty line) will face an incentive to falsify their situation.
Fortunately,  design features can usually be found that can reduce such distortions.  The second
important message is that it is important to allow for behavioral responses both in assessing policy
effectiveness,  and in devising effective policy interventions.
There are other costs associated with participation. Atkinson (PSP) discusses the widespread
phenomenon of low take-up-the  nonclaiming of benefits by eligible parties. Lack of information
about programs partly explains incomplete take-up. But additional reasons include the time costs,
stigma and other costs perceived by potential beneficiaries.  Again, a scheme's  benefits should be
calculated net of such costs (also see Besley 1990).
34A further  cost often associated with targeted programs is their perceived failure to achieve
political support because they help but a fraction of the population,  and one typically lacking political
clout.  Indeed, an incidence of public spending biased against the poor is professed to reflect the
reality that governments  "misbehave" precisely to please powerful elites and hold on to power
(Birdsall and James  1993). It is also often argued that universally available public spending schemes
are successful and sustainable due to the fact that a wide spectrum of the community maintain a stake
in them-and  perceive them as a nonstigmatizing right (Sen in PSP, Stocpol  1991). Some programs
may require a socially and economically mixed group of participants for their success. For example,
in the United States this argument has been invoked as grounds for not limiting public housing project
units to the very neediest (New York Times 1993).
There are country examples for which these explanations are persuasive. Yet, some targeted
schemes-usually  ones with important indirect benefits-are  known to have achieved quite widespread
support,  well beyond direct participants. The popularity and sustainability of Maharashtra's  EGS is
often explained by the scheme's  indirect benefits: well-off urban dwellers,  whose taxes finance the
EGS, support  it because it helps stem rural migration to Bombay; the rural elite derive benefits from
the assets built and the fact that the scheme keeps their labor force in the area through the lean
seasons (Echeverri-Gent  1988); finally, in an environment prone  to drought and other sources of
severe vulnerability,  the scheme's promise of a job in times of need provides a form of insurance or
safety net, and hence achieves support from many rural inhabitants who do not participate in normal
times (Ravallion  1991). Others argue, as Jarvis and Micklewright do in PSP that the historical
evolution of policies is an important factor influencing attitudes both of the public and reformers  and
the political economy of targeted policies.
Clearly,  the fact that a program is well targeted does not ensure that it is a cost-effective way
to reduce poverty since the extra costs incurred by targeting and the political-economy responses may
35actually worsen the final distribution  of living standards when compared to untargeted  programs.
There can be no general supposition  in favor of targeting;  the choice must be made on a case by case
basis. How should that choice be made?
4.2.2  Evaluating  a targeted  scheme
In stylized  form, the policy problem is as follows. The goal is to reduce  poverty, but to do so
in the most efficient  way-"efficient" in that it would not be possible  to have a greater impact on the
living standards of the poor with the available  resources. The impact on poverty depends on the
benefits  to the poor from the scheme less any costs they incur in participating.  The resources include
the budgetary cost, and in some cases they may also include  certain costs incurred by the nonpoor and
not properly accounted  for in the budgetary  cost. A convincing  evaluation  should compare a scheme's
impact  on poverty with the impact  that could have been achieved  through realistic  alternative  uses of
the same resources. It is sometimes  unclear what the policy options are, but we can always compare a
targeted policy's impact  with that attainable  through a universal (untargeted)  handout of the same
budget. Ravallion  and Datt (PSP) discuss  and illustrate  the use of this approach, and variations on the
approach, for assessing  the targeting  effectiveness  of Maharashtra's  EGS.
The appraisal of a targeted  scheme's impact  on poverty (compared  to what could have been
done otherwise)  is not always easy. As I have emphasized,  perhaps the greatest difficulty is in
assessing  the relevant  counterfactual:  what would  happen without  the scheme? I have already
discussed  the important  efforts of Cox and Jimenez, Sahn and Alderman, and Ravallion  and Datt (in
PSP) on this front. Of these, only Ravallion  and Datt use their estimation  of the counterfactual  to go
the further step and see how the policy's actual  poverty impact  compares to that achievable  through a
hypothetical  alternative  use of the same budget. Their results are sobering. Once all the costs
associated  with the public works scheme have been weighed, the same outlay uniformly  transferred to
36all households-rich and poor-appears to make no less of a dent on income poverty. The authors
offer certain caveats and reasons for why they may have underestimated  the benefits from the
employment  scheme-they have ignored  externalities  arising from the infrastructure  the schemes
build, for example. Either way, their results should  give policymakers  and advisers committed  to
reducing  poverty reason to pause.
The studies under discussion  here notwithstanding,  there are in fact very few examples  of
good evaluations  in the development  context. This may be due in part to the high cost of properly
evaluating  such programs. But there also seems to be a systematic  neglect of evaluation; only a tiny
fraction of resources used go into seeing  if they are properly used. In addition to expanding  research
efforts in the direction  of incorporating  behavioral  responses  into benefit incidence  studies, we also
need to introduce-ex ante-careful  monitoring  and experimental  methods  on a selective  basis to
better understand  what works and what doesn't.
In the meantime, there are ways to take a first stab at such assessments.  One should  begin by
listing all the different social costs that a scheme is likely to entail: administration,  costs of
participation  (such as foregone  incomes  through displaced  labor or displaced  transfers from rich
patrons), and any indirect  costs incurred by the nonpoor (such as the loss to previous  beneficiaries
from an untargeted  scheme). Some of these costs may be weighted  differently  to others; for example,
assessments  often attach low or zero weight  to small losses  to the rich. Some will also be less
important  than others, depending  on the specific  circumstances  faced (foregone  incomes  in a rural
public works scheme will naturally  be low during a drought, for example).
Next, one should take stock and make a judgement  about whether  these costs are high relative
to the benefits to the poor. In general, benefits will be dispersed widely  among  the poor, and so there
will be an issue of how gains at different levels should be weighted;  the most widely accepted
judgement is that gains to the poorest should receive  highest weight  (Atkinson  discusses  this issue in
37PSP). Some commonly  used measuring  rods do not do this (such as the mean monetary transfer, or
the change in the number  of the poor). Without imposing  an explicit formula for aggregation,  much
can be learnt by forming a simple tabulation-a quick and dirty incidence  of benefits table-of  what
the likely monetary gains will be for each broad subgroup  of the poor-"ultra-poor",  "poor", "near-
poor". The ability  to make clear quantitative  assessments  will vary greatly, depending  on data
availability.  However, a reasonably  well researched  qualitative  picture may often be informative.
One should also look closely  at how benefits can be enhanced, and costs reduced, such as
through more care in designing  and implementing  targeted schemes.
4.2.3  Design and implementation  can help reduce targeting  costs
A key lesson from experience  and many of the studies under review, is that the costs and
benefits from fine targeting  depend critically  on program design. Subsidizing  a food staple heavily
consumed  by the rich, or setting  the wage rate too high in a public works scheme, can really destroy
targeting  performance. Under ideal circumstances  the policymaker  would know incomes and distribute
transfers to eliminate  poverty accordingly.  All of the poor and none of the nonpoor would be covered
and the cost of bringing everyone  to the poverty line would  exactly equal the poverty gap. In practice,
the most extreme form of targeting,  means testing, is difficult  and costly to do well in developing
countries. Incomes  are particularly  hard to measure in poor agricultural  settings  where they are also
often subject to extreme variability  from one season  to the next. Effective  means  testing would require
collection  of detailed  and comprehensive  information  coupled  with continual  updating and verification.
This is well beyond the capabilities  of most administrative  agencies. Reliance  on local agents with
intimate  local knowledge  has sometimes  been found to work well, and sometimes  to flounder  in
nepotism  and corruption. Ravallion  and Datt (PSP) provide  evidence  on the feeble connection  between
living standards and benefits received  from the Integrated  Rural Development  Programme credit
38scheme in one Indian State-a  supposedly  means-tested  program. Atkinson  (in PSP) elaborates on the
severe difficulties  experienced  with means testing  even in industrialized  countries.
Hence, we often search for identifying  characteristics,  or indicators,  which are highly
correlated with low incomes.  In targeting  on the basis of indicators-what Atkinson  in his study terms
categorical  transfers-it  will always be better to use correlates  that are easily observed and difficult to
manipulate. Employment  or nutritional  status are easier to manipulate  than gender and old age, for
example. Female headship  is claimed to be highly  correlated with low living standards in some
countries. Yet, use of such an identifier  has also been found to result in severe moral hazard problems
conspiring  against the formation  of stable adult family relationships.  Possible  further impacts on
children's emotional  development  may cause the deleterious  effects to go well beyond the
misrepresentation  of who heads the household  (Appleton  and Collier PSP). Such negative
consequences  of choosing an indicator  should  be carefully  avoided.
Combining  several indicators has often worked well to achieve  a fairly high level of targeting
without resorting to costly means testing. Atkinson  (PSP) details the vast array of categorical
conditions  Western social security systems  have used to fine tune the targeting  of family
benefits-family size, age and activity of children, work profile of parents  and so forth. Appleton  and
Collier (PSP) argue for using gender in combination  with other indicators. For example,  Bangladesh's
well respected  Grameen Bank credit scheme screens on the basis of female  gender, landlessness,  and
rural residence.
However, the correlation  between  popular indicators  and poverty is often far from exact. It is
important  to be aware of the limits of much indicator  targeting. Where research efforts have tried to
gauge possible impacts  on poverty, results call at best for qualified  optimism  (Ravallion  1993,
Ravallion  and Sen 1994, and Datt and Ravallion  1993).  Geographical  location  and landlessness  are
two indicators  which are typically associated  with deprivation.  Ravallion  (1993) and Datt and
39Ravallion (1993) turn their attention to the evaluation of geographical targeting through redistributive
public transfers to Indonesia's  poorest regions and India's  poorest states respectively.  When the
targeting instrument cannot be sharpened further (as in targeting more finely within the regions),  the
potential poverty impact of even an optimal, administratively costless, allocation of a set budget  is
found to be very small for both countries. In a similar vein, Ravallion and Sen (1993) simulate the
effects of targeting transfers to the landless in Bangladesh with and without effects on productivity.
The results indicate that due to the indicator's  bluntness, too many nonpoor would benefit,  while
many of the poor would be excluded from such a scheme. Poverty would be alleviated but the
maximum impact-even  under seemingly ideal conditions-is  likely to be small from such indicators.
In some cases,  letting the poor select themselves both minimizes targeting costs and results in
well targeted benefit incidence. Self-targeting schemes are designed such that the poor,  and only the
poor wish to participate.  They achieve this by imposing a cost of participation that only the poor are
willing to incur, as for example,  a work requirement in return for low wages. Only those who cannot
command a better  wage will turn up for the scheme. Another example is given by subsidies on lower
quality (real or perceived) goods, which wealthier groups will tend to shun. Although the
administrative costs of identifying the poor are avoided, the costs of participation should not be
ignored as I have argued above. But there are ways to ensure they are minimized. A public
employment scheme can reduce participation costs by being implemented in an area or time period
particularly hard hit by unemployment. Inferior quality should not also mean unnutritional or
indigestible.
In general, tacking on a targeted scheme to existing social welfare  infrastructure can also
minimize administrative costs.  Many of the transfer programs reviewed by Grosh in PSP follow this
principle.  Public health clinics that the rich bypass can be used to provide additional benefits such as
food stamps to those attending.  School lunch and supplementary feeding programs  in disadvantaged
40regions are another  example. Attempts at targeting the poor through the public primary education or
health care system will tend to be more effective when well developed private systems already serve
the rich.  This last point is brought out forcefully in the Malaysian health sector case where,  while
public sector reforms aimed towards investments in public goods and improvements in equity, the
private sector grew both in quality and importance (Hammer and others PSP).  Design can also
improve political sustainability. For example by promising insurance to a wide set of people and by
exploiting the external benefits to the nonpoor from reducing poverty as in the Maharashtra  EGS
situation discussed above.
Finally,  some schemes successfully blend various design features,  including reliance on a
combination of targeting mechanisms, to enhance performance.  For example, a food stamp program
in Honduras bases eligibility on village of residence and being a child under age 5 or a
pregnant/lactating woman (indicator targeting), and use of health services (self-targeting).  The scheme
piggybacks on existing service deliverv infrastructure (health posts) and provides an incentive for
vulnerable groups to use primary  health care. A number of additional interesting examples are
presented by Atkinson (PSP) in the context of existing and past practice  with respect to targeting
family benefits in Western industrialized economies.
5.  Conclusion
The case for government spending as a redistributive instrument will depend at least partly on
what other  instruments are available for this purpose.  While developing countries tend to have quite
limited opportunities for redistributive direct taxation, even when a country can implement an optimal
nonlinear income tax, there can still be an important redistributive role for public spending (Boadway
and Marchand  1995).
41Public spending is a potentially powerful  instrument for fighting poverty.  How well does it
perform  in this capacity? How can it have greater impact on poverty? These are the broad  questions
with which this paper and the research project it reports on have been concerned.
We must first be clear on how performance is to be judged.  Disparate assumptions about
policy objectives are often at the root of disagreements and controversies in program assessments and
recommendations.  Agreeing on the relevance of the welfare objective is easier than  reaching
consensus on what precisely it should be-the  gulf between welfarists and nonwelfarists and the camps
within each paradigm may never be fully bridged. That need not derail  assessments of public
spending programs  and efforts at reform. But it should alert us to the need for clarity in the
underlying assumptions and attentiveness to how these may influence policy conclusions.
Evaluating a policy's  impact requires assessing how different things would have been in its
absence.  However, the counterfactual of no intervention is tricky to quantify precisely. One
approach-known  as benefit incidence-ignores  behavioral responses and second round effects, and
simply uses the cost of provision as a proxy for benefits received.  Other methods focus entirely on
the individual's  valuation of the policy benefits allowing for responses to changes in the individual's
budget set.  Recent studies attempt to incorporate behavioral responses into incidence assessments.
However, allowing for behavioral responses in policy analysis often requires that other  assumptions
be introduced.  It would be premature at this time to assume that more complicated methodologies will
necessarily result in better and/or essentially different policy advice.
The search for answers is also constrained by less than ideal data. In several areas known to
be potentially critical to policy conclusions-such  as dynamic issues in public spending incidence,  and
intrahousehold distribution-adequate  data are only now starting to be collected. Economists have also
tended to give scant attention to the macroeconomic, political economy and institutional environments.
There  is ample evidence that these influence spending decisions and outcomes.
42Some reasonably  robust conclusions  have emerged from studies of public spending incidence,
including  some in PSP. Spending  on basic services-notably primary and secondary  education  and
basic health care-is  found to reach the poor almost  universally. The case for "broad targeting" by
expanding  the share of public spending  on these services  is well substantiated.  Yet even here, care is
required in monitoring that marginal  investments  are not lavished  on increased quality for the better-
off. Certain food subsidy  and distribution  schemes, social cash transfers (such as are common  in the
former Soviet Union countries  and Eastern Europe),  public employment  schemes  and other targeted
transfer schemes  have at times been quite propoor. However, many  programs whose  stated rationale
is to reduce poverty, have instead  been dismal and expensive  failures. A popular reaction  has been to
clamor for reforms of public spending  towards finer targeting  of benefits to the poor.
Most public spending  programs are to some degree "targeted."  The key question  is: what
degree of targeting is optimal? Other things being equal, the more ways one discriminates between
beneficiaries,  the greater the impact  of targeting  on poverty. However, other things are not equal.
Fine targeting sometimes  comes at a cost to the poor. Administrative  costs may escalate, political
support may vanish, and behavioral  responses  may create extra costs to targeted interventions.  There
is no simple answer to how much targeting  is desirable, but there are some clear principles to guide
choice, and some suggestive  empirical evidence  from past experience,  including  many of the studies
reviewed  here.
The optimal  mix of targeted  and universal  programs in fighting  poverty will depend  on a
number  of factors, including  the characteristics  of the poor (who the poor are, how many there are,
and why they are poor) and country  specific circumstances  (initial conditions,  infrastructure
development  and administrative  capabilities).  When  poverty is widespread  and administrative
capacities  are low, broad targeting will be particularly  desirable  and results from incidence  of public
spending studies should help guide  sectoral and intrasectoral  allocations.  In general, what is needed is
43a combination  of universalism  in certain categories  of spending  and finer targeting in others, such as
in providing  safety nets. Such a two-pronged  approach is a sound starting point for policy design. In
implementing  it, one should, however, never confuse  the ends and means  of policy. Targeting  should
be seen as a potential instrument  never as an objective  in its own right.
44Notes
1.  The research done for the project was presented  at a conference  held in June 1992, then papers
were revised for the book, Public Spendin,e  and the Poor: Theory and Evidence, edited by Dominique
van de Walle and Kimberly Nead, to be published  by The Johns Hopkins  University  Press.
2.  For evaluations of the poverty impact of targeting correlates of poverty see Ravallion (1993),
Ravallion  and Sen (1994), and Datt and Ravallion  (1993).
3.  Note that from Alderman and Sahn's study, it is not clear how the released work time is allocated.
One would have to first ascertain whether leisure has indeed increased. Whether the poor's leisure
increases more so than the rich's would also be germane. Other issues arise. Parents may be devoting
more time to their children, in which case there may also be important  externalities  to take account of.
4.  The best known standard benefit incidence  studies for developing  countries are the early ones by
Meerman  (1979) for Malaysia  and Selowsky  (1979)  for Colombia.  Selden  and Wasylenko  (1992)  review
the literature.
5.  For a review of results and a critique  see Litvack  and Bodart (1993).
6.  A summary  of incidence  results for developed  countries  from existing  studies is given in Selden
and Wasylenko  (1992).
7.  Note that this is subject  to the underlying  welfare objective  as discussed  earlier.
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